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Hierarchical access control policies, inwhich users and objects are associatedwith nodes in
a hierarchy, can be enforced using cryptographic mechanisms. Protected data is encrypted
and authorized users are given the appropriate keys. Lazy re-encryption techniques and
temporal hierarchical access control policies require that multiple keys may be associated
with a node in the hierarchy. In this paper, we introduce the notion of a multi-key assign-
ment scheme to address this requirement. We deﬁne bounded, unbounded, synchronous,
and asynchronous schemes.We demonstrate that bounded, synchronous schemes provide
an alternative to temporal key assignment schemes in the literature, and that unbounded
asynchronous schemes provide the desired support for lazy re-encryption.
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1. Introduction
One of the fundamental security services in computer systems is access control, a mechanism for constraining the inter-
action between (authenticated) users and protected resources. Generally, access control is implemented by an authorization
service, which includes an authorization decision function for deciding whether a user request to access a resource should
be permitted or not. The output of an authorization decision function is usually determined by evaluating the access request
with respect to an authorization policy.
It is sometimes appropriate, however, to enforce an authorization policy using cryptographic techniques. In such circum-
stances, protected data (objects) are encrypted and authorized users are given the appropriate cryptographic keys. Such
an approach is useful when objects are: read often, by many users; written once, or rarely, by the owner of the data; and
transmitted over unprotected networks. Fu et al. [10] cite content distribution networks, such as Akami and BitTorrent, as
examples where some kind of cryptographic access control is particularly suitable.
A no-read-up information ﬂow policy [9] controls access to resources by comparing security labels assigned to users and
objects; a user may have read access to an object (causing an information ﬂow from object to user) if and only if the user’s
security label is at least as high as that of the object. Such a policy can be implemented by associating a symmetric encryption
key with each security label and encrypting objects with the appropriate key. A user is given (or can derive) the encryption
key for each label less than or equal to his security label. Since the seminal paper of Akl and Taylor [1], there has been a
considerable amount of research into so-called key assignment schemes, which seek tominimize the number of keys required
by each user (see the recent survey paper [7] for an overview of such schemes).
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Motivation and related work. One of the main practical problems with cryptographic access control in general, and with key
assignment schemes in particular, is that huge amounts of data may need to be re-encrypted when a key is changed. There
are a number of reasons why keys might change, of which the most are important are user revocation, key compromise and
access control policy requirements.
One way of alleviating the burden of object re-encryption following a user revocation is to re-encrypt objects with the
new key only when the content changes. This type of approach, sometimes called lazy re-encryption, has been used in
cryptographic ﬁle systems [4,13]. A consequence of this is that a user may require two or more keys for objects in the same
protection domain: one ormore keys for objects that have not yet been re-encrypted and one for those that have. The burden
of object re-encryption is particularly onerous in key assignment schemes: if a user with security label l is revoked, then the
key for every security label l′  l has to be changed and every object with security label l′ has to be re-encrypted. Therefore,
lazy re-encryption is a particularly appropriate technique for key assignment schemes and one that has not previously been
studied.
Some key assignment schemes incorporate a temporal element (see [3] for a survey of such schemes): Bertino et al., for
example, have used cryptographic access control to restrict access to subscription-based content,with each timeperiod using
a different key to encrypt content [6]. In this case, a user may require two or more keys for objects in the same protection
domain: one key for objects encrypted in the current period and one for each of the preceding periods. All such research has
assumed that all keys (including those for future time intervals) are issued when the scheme is instantiated. Although this
simpliﬁes key distribution, there is, however, a very good reason for not doing so: if a user pays subscriptions periodically
and defaults on the payments, it will be necessary to update all the keys in the scheme in order to revoke the defaulter’s
authorization.
Contributions. In this paper, we examine extensions to existing key assignment schemes that permit several keys to be
associated with each security label and illustrate how such schemes can be used to support lazy re-encryption and temporal
access control policies. The main contributions of the paper are: to extend lazy revocation schemes to hierarchical access
control policies (in contrast to the Unix-like “owner-group-world” policies of previouswork), and to permit the timed release
of new encryption keys for temporal hierarchical access control policies. The schemes presented in this paper are derived
from techniques used for existing key assignment schemes, in which each label is associated with a single encryption key.
They also make use of some of the ideas of Fu et al. [10] and work on one-time passwords [11].
Outline. In the next section, we summarize the characteristics of information ﬂow policies and existing key assignment
schemes. We then describe our new schemes, how they support multiple keys for each security label, and discuss the
potential applications of each type of scheme. We conclude the paper with a summary of our contributions and some ideas
for future work.
2. Preliminaries
A partially ordered set (or poset) is a pair (L,), where  is a reﬂexive, anti-symmetric, transitive binary relation on L.
We say x covers y, denoted y x, if y < x and there does not exist z ∈ L such that y < z < x. L is a total order if for all x, y ∈ L,
either x  y or y  x.
The Hasse diagram of a poset is the directed graph (L,) [8]. A simple Hasse diagram is shown in Fig. 1a (on page 691).
Note that d  a, but this “transitive edge” is not included in the graph. Note also that all edges are assumed to be directed
upwards.
An order ideal I ⊆ L has the property that if x ∈ L and y  x then y ∈ L. Similarly, an order ﬁlter F ⊆ L has the property that
if x ∈ F and y  x then y ∈ F . The order ideal generated by x ∈ L, denoted ↓x, is deﬁned to be {y ∈ L : y  x}. It is easy to show
that the set complement of an order ideal in L is an order ﬁlter (and vice versa) [8].
Henceforth we adopt the following conventions: given a poset L and x, y ∈ L, we may write y < x if y  x and y /= x, and
we may write x  y if y  x; x, when used as input to some (cryptographic) function, will denote a string identifying x ∈ L;
E denotes a symmetric encryption algorithm, and Ek(p) denotes the encryption of plaintext p with key k; s ‖ t denotes the
Fig. 1. An example of the Akl–Taylor scheme.
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concatenation of strings s and t;m | nmeans that integerm divides integer nwithout remainder; (m,n) denotes the greatest
common divisor of integersm and n; in particular, (m,n) = 1 means thatm and n are co-prime.
We assume the existence of an RSA key generator, a randomized algorithm that takes a security parameter k as input and
outputs a triple (n, e, d) such that:
• n = pq, where p and q are distinct odd primes;
• e ∈ Z*φ(n), where φ(n) = (p − 1)(q − 1), e > 1, and (e,φ(n)) = 1;
• d ∈ Z*φ(n), where ed ≡ 1 mod φ(n).
We also assume the existence of an associated hash function, whichmaps elements ofZ*n (in some standard representation)
to bit-strings of some desired length.
2.1. Information ﬂow policies
Deﬁnition 1. An information ﬂow policy is a tuple (L,,U,O,λ), where: (L,) is a (ﬁnite) partially ordered set of security
labels;U is a set of users;O is a set of (protected) objects;λ : U ∪ O → L is a security function that associates users and objects
with security labels.
Such policies were of particular interest in themid-1970s through to themid-1980s, and formed part of the Bell-LaPadula
security model [5]. The basic semantics of the policy is that a user u can read an object o if λ(u) λ(o). Henceforth, we will
represent an information ﬂow policy (L,,U,O,λ) as a pair (L,) with the tacit understanding that U, O and λ are given.
Clearly, one way of implementing such a policy is to encrypt an object with security label y ∈ L with a key κ(y), and to
provide all users with security label x  ywith the key κ(y). Henceforth we assume that the policy will be implemented by
encrypting objects and distributing keys to users, enabling them to decrypt the objects to which they should have access.
A consequence of using cryptographic methods to control access is that users may cache decrypted data objects locally.
Hence, revoking a user’s assignment to a security level does not necessarily have an immediate effect on that user’s ability
to read documents he has previously accessed. For this reason, lazy re-encryption – only re-encrypting data objects when
they are modiﬁed – is a reasonable strategy to employ in this context.
2.2. Key assignment schemes
A key assignment scheme (KAS) is a means of implementing an information ﬂow policy using cryptographic techniques.
The simplest such scheme provides the user u the set of keys {κ(y) : y  λ(u)}. More sophisticated KASs seek to minimize
the number of keys that need to be distributed to users. This entails either making certain additional information publicly
available or providing each user with additional secret information (or both).
A recent paper formalized the characteristic features of a key assignment scheme [7]. In simple terms, there must be
a way of choosing keys for each x ∈ L, a method for constructing public information, and a method for deriving keys. The
paper also identiﬁed ﬁve generic constructions for key assignment schemes and compared these schemes according to the
following criteria: amount of public storage required, amount of private storage required, complexity of key derivation, and
complexity of key updates. We discuss two of these schemes in the next two sections. In both schemes a user u has a single
key κ(λ(u)).
2.2.1. IKE KAS
An iterative key encrypting (IKE) KAS uses public information to enable a user to iteratively derive keys for which he is
authorized. The trusted center:
• chooses κ(x), x ∈ L, at random from the key space;
• publishes {Eκ(x)(κ(y)) : y x : x, y ∈ L}.
Informally, the public information “encrypts” edges in the Hasse diagram: for any edge (x, y), κ(y)will be encryptedwith
κ(x) and stored in the public information. Key derivation is performed by traversing a path in the Hasse diagram decrypting
keys along the way. More formally, if y < x, then there exists a path y = z0 z1 · · ·  zn = x, n 1, so a user with security
label x can successively derive keys κ(zn−1), . . . ,κ(z0) = κ(y). Assuming a suitable encryption method is chosen, no user
can feasibly compute keys for which he is not authorized.
The AFB scheme, due to Atallah, Frikken and Blanton is an example of an IKE KAS [2]. The key space is {0, 1}l , for some
integer l, and the public information is deﬁned to be {κ(y) ⊕ h(κ(x) ‖ y) : y x}, where h : {0, 1}* → {0, 1}l is a hash function.
2.2.2. The Akl–Taylor scheme
The second generic scheme is a node-based key assignment scheme. Key derivation in a node-based KAS is direct and the
user is only required to store a single key. The disadvantage of a node-based KAS is that key updates may be more disruptive
than in an IKE KAS, because keys are deﬁned in terms of public information. The earliest KAS (of any type) is due to Akl and
Taylor; it remains the best known, simplest, and most effective node-based KAS [1]. The trusted center
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• runs the RSA key generator to obtain (n, e, d), of which only n is used;
• chooses a secret s at random from Z*n;
• chooses a mapping ν : L → N* such that ν(x) | ν(y) if and only if y  x;
• deﬁnes κ(x) = sν(x) mod n;
• publishes {n} ∪ (ν(x) : x ∈ L).
A user with security label x can derive κ(y), y  x, using private information κ(x) and public information ν(x) and ν(y),
by computing
(
κ(x)
) ν(y)
ν(x) = (sν(x))
ν(y)
ν(x) = sν(y) = κ(y).
Akl and Taylor proved that no user (or set of users) can derive a key for which he is not authorized, provided ν is chosen
appropriately. We discuss the security of key assignment schemes in Section 2.2.4. The canonical way of constructing ν is to
associate a distinct prime α(x) with each x ∈ L and to deﬁne
ν(x) =
∏
y  x
α(y). (1)
An example of this construction is shown in Fig. 1. L is shown in Fig. 1a; the small italic numbers in Fig. 1b denote the primes
associated with each element of L; and the larger numbers denote the value of ν(x) for each x ∈ L. Note that ν(x) | ν(y) if
and only if x  y.
MacKinnon et al. identiﬁed a different initial labeling α : L → N, based on a decomposition of L into disjoint chains [14].
In other words, every element in L is a member of precisely one chain. We associate a distinct prime αi with the ith chain.
Then for x ∈ L, the jth element in the ith chain (where the maximal element in each chain is the ﬁrst element), we deﬁne
α(x) = αj
i
and ν(x) = lcm{α(y) : y  x}.
An example of this labeling, whichwe call theMTMA labeling (after its creators,MacKinnon, Taylor,Meijer and Akl), is shown
in Fig. 1c. The solid lines denote a chain (a > b > d) associated with the prime 2; the remaining node (c) forms a trivial chain
associated with the prime 3.
2.2.3. Implementation issues
It has long been claimed that key derivation in the Akl–Taylor scheme may be expensive in practice (see [2,12], for
example) because it appears that a user must compute
κ(y) = κ(x)
ν(y)
ν(x)
to obtain κ(y) from κ(x), where ν(y) and ν(x) are the products of primes. This means that an expensive division operation
is required followed by an exponentiation. However, it was noted by Crampton et al. [7] that the ν values were simply used
to encode the structure of the poset, and that this encoding could be done in such a way as to avoid expensive division
operations during key derivation.
Consider the deﬁnition of ν in the canonical labeling:
ν(x) =
∏
y  x
α(x).
The product is taken over all elements that are not less than or equal to x. The set of elements less than or equal to x is (by
deﬁnition) the order ideal generated by x. Hence, the product used to compute ν(x) is taken over the complement of the
order ideal ↓x, which is an order ﬁlter.
We now choose some enumeration of the elements of L = {x1, . . . , x|L|} and for each x ⊆ L, deﬁne the characteristic tuple
(of x)χx = (b1, . . . , b|L|), where bi = 0 if xi  x and bi = 1 otherwise. Hence, wemay represent the elements of the ﬁlter L \ ↓x
by χx . Moreover, we may publish this information and the mapping α associating each xi ∈ L with a prime α(xi). Now,
ν(x) =
|L|∏
i=1
(
α(xi)
)bi ,
where bi is the ith element of χx . Hence,
ν(y)
ν(x)
=
∏|L|
i=1
(
α(xi)
)b′
i
∏|L|
i=1
(
α(xi)
)bi ,
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where b′
i
is the ith element of χy. Hence
ν(y)
ν(x)
=
|L|∏
i=1
(
α(xi)
)b′′
i ,
where b′′
i
= b′
i
− bi. In otherwords, no division is required.We simply take the co-ordinatewise difference of the characteristic
tuples of x and y and then multiply the appropriate primes together.
Taking our running example in Fig. 1 and enumerating the elements of L in alphabetical order, the order ideal generated
by b is {b, d} and the order ideal generated by d is {d}. The characteristic tuples of b and d are (1, 0, 1, 0) and (1, 1, 1, 0),
respectively. To compute κ(d) from κ(b) we compute (1, 1, 1, 0) − (1, 0, 1, 0) to obtain (0, 1, 0, 0), which means that we
have to raise κ(b) to the power of the prime associated with b to obtain κ(d). This can be conﬁrmed by looking at
Fig. 1b. In short, no division of exponents is required. That is, there exist efﬁcient implementations of the Akl–Taylor
scheme.
We now observe that a similar type of representation can be used for the MTMA labeling. Recall that L is partitioned
into i chains, the ith chain being associated with a distinct prime αi, α(x) = αji and ν(x) = lcm{α(y) : y  x}. In other words,
ν(x) = ∏wi=1 αaii , where ai ∈ N. In this context, the characteristic tuple of x is deﬁned to be (a1, . . . , aw) ∈ N
w
. In our example,
we have two chains and we have
χa = (0, 0), χb = (1, 1), χc = (2, 0), χd = (2, 1).
As before, division of exponents corresponds to subtraction of tuples. To derive κ(d) from κ(b), for example, we compute
(2, 1) − (1, 1) = (1, 0), which implies that we raise κ(b) to the power of the prime associated with the ﬁrst chain.
2.2.4. Security considerations
The fact that ν(x) | ν(y) if, and only if, x  y implies a user uwith security label x cannot derive a key κ(y), y  x, unless
u can compute roots modulo n. This is known as the RSA problem and is believed to be as hard as factoring n: it is this RSA
assumption onwhich the security of the RSA cryptosystem is based [15]. Akl and Taylor proved that no set of users can collude
to derive a key for which none of them is authorized, provided ν is chosen appropriately. In particular, we have the following
result.
Theorem 2 (Akl and Taylor). κ(y) can be feasibly computed from a set of keys {κ(x1), . . . ,κ(xm)} if, and only if, gcd{ν(x1), . . . ,
ν(xm)} | ν(y).
The result is proved by showing that if this property did not hold then it would be feasible to solve the RSA problem.
Hence, we choose ν in such a way that for all x ∈ L,
gcd{ν(y) : y  x} ν(x). (2)
The canonical labeling deﬁned in Eq. (1), ν(x) = ∏y x α(y), satisﬁes property (2), as does the MTMA labeling.
Atallah et al. examined the security of IKE KASs [2], introducing the notions of key recovery and key indistinguishability,
which are analogous to plaintext recovery and plaintext indistinguishability in conventional security analyses. Informally, a
scheme is secure against key recovery if it is infeasible for a group of users to pool key information to obtain a key for which
none of them is authorized. In this sense, the Akl–Taylor scheme is secure against key recovery.
Key indistinguishability is believed to be an important consideration in IKE KASs [10]. Informally, if an attacker a is given a
key k that purports to be κ(x) for some x ∈ L and a is able to decide (under reasonable computational assumptions) whether
k is actually κ(x) with some probability of success signiﬁcantly greater than 1/2, then the scheme does not have the key
indistinguishability property. Clearly the basic IKE KAS does not have this property, since an attacker that knows κ(y), for
some y  x, can determinewhether k is indeed κ(x) by trying to derive κ(y) from k and the public information. If he succeeds
in deriving κ(y), then he knows that k = κ(x).
The IKE KASs described in this paper do not have the key indistinguishability property, although Atallah et al. [2] and,
independently, Fu et al. [10] have developed straightforward modiﬁcations to existing schemes to obtain this property.1 We
do not make similar modiﬁcations to our schemes for ease of exposition.
Ateniese et al. [3] extended the security analysis of Atallah et al. to temporal key assignment schemes, and also considered
active and passive adversaries. They showed that an active adversary has no advantage over a passive one for either key
recovery or key indistinguishability. In other words, the security properties of an IKE KAS appear to be dependent only on
1 Informally, users with security label x are provided with a secret σ(x), rather than an encryption key κ(x). The secret σ(x) may be used to derive κ(x)
(using some suitable publicly known one-way function) and σ(y) for all y  x (using existing techniques for key assignment schemes). The point being that
an attacker cannot deduce σ(x) from κ(x) and hence is unable to use key derivation (as described above) to distinguish the genuine κ(x) from a random
value.
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the security properties of the algorithm used to encrypt keys, the results of which aremade public.We hope to conﬁrm these
types of properties for our schemes in our future work.
3. Multi-key assignment schemes
Wenow introduce the concept of amulti-key assignment scheme (MKAS), which is a key assignment scheme that supports
multiple keys for each security label. We assume there are a number of update events indexed by the natural numbers, and
that the ith key is used to
• encrypt objects created between the ith and (i + 1)th updates, and
• re-encrypt existing objects whose contents change between the ith and (i + 1)th updates.
The ith time interval is the period between the ith and (i + 1)th update.
If a user u is currently authorized to access an object o, then u is also authorized to access any object o′ such that
λ(o) λ(o′). This implies that u must be able to compute each key that has been used for λ(o′). We also require that a
user v revoked at the jth key update cannot access any object created or amended since the jth update. We write κi(x) to
denote the ith key for security label x.2 In other words, an authorized user u in time interval i can derive any key in the set
{κj(l) : l  λ(u), 0 j  i}.
There are two main considerations when designing a multi-key assignment scheme.
• Is the number of updates determined in advance?We say anMKAS is bounded if the number of updates is pre-determined,
and unbounded otherwise.
Bounded MKASs are well suited for temporal access control policies, because the number of time periods will usually
be ﬁxed and known in advance. They are less appropriate for schemes intended to support lazy re-encryption, since
the number of updates will not be predictable. Unbounded MKASs are far more suitable for lazy re-encryption.
• Can κ(x) be updated independently of κ(y)? We say an MKAS is synchronous if all keys are updated at the same time,
and asynchronous otherwise.
Synchronous MKASs are particularly suitable for temporal access control policies, because each time interval requires
a fresh set of keys, one for each security label. Asynchronous MKASs may well be more suitable for implementing lazy
re-encryption, because it may only be necessary to update a small number of keys following the revocation of a user.
The key observation to make prior to introducing the schemes we have devised is to note that the requirements can
be regarded as having two dimensions: a “policy dimension”, determined by L; and a “temporal dimension”, which can be
modeled as a chain of (update) events. In the next section we consider three different ways of realizing bounded schemes,
each having different properties and advantages. In Section 3.2 we introduce two unbounded synchronous schemes. In
Section 3.3 we describe two unbounded asynchronous schemes. We conclude with a summary and comparison of the
respective advantages of our schemes.
3.1. Bounded MKASs
We assume that there are a maximum ofm updates, wherem is chosen in advance by the scheme administrator, and that
the keys for L′ ⊆ L are updated. The basic technique is to construct an IKE KAS for (L,) for each time interval. In addition, we
provide amechanism for computingκj(x) fromκi(x) for any j < i. Note that the schemes described can be either synchronous
or asynchronous; a synchronous scheme is obtained by setting L′ = L at each update.
3.1.1. Node-based iterative MKAS
In this scheme we choose the keys κ0(x), . . . ,κm(x) in such a way that κj(x) can be derived directly from κi(x), for all
j < i. The construction is based on a very simple instance of the Akl–Taylor scheme in which L is a chain ofm elements.
The trusted center ﬁrst obtains a large compound integer n using an RSA key generator. For each x ∈ L, the trusted center
• chooses a secret s(x) ∈ Z*n, such that for all y ∈ L, (s(x), s(y)) /= 1 if and only if x = y;
• deﬁnes κj(x) =
(
s(x)
)2m−j
mod n;
• deﬁnes an IKE for L and publishes {Eκ0(x)(κ0(y)) : y ∈ L, y x}.
We call the set of keys κ0(x), . . . ,κm(x) an Akl-Taylor key chain.
Let the set of keys changed at the ith update be L′
i
. Following the ith update, for each x ∈ L′
i
, the trusted center obtains the
next key for x and updates the public information. In particular, the trusted center re-computes and replaces {Eκi(x)(κi(y)) :
x ∈ L′, y ∈ L, y x} and {Eκi(x)(κi(y)) : y ∈ L′, x ∈ L, y x}. As a consequence, the amount of public information required by
this scheme remains constant.
In order to recover κj(y), given κi(x), with y  x and j  i, the user ﬁrst computes κi(y) using the public information. The
user then computes
(
κi(y)
)2i−j = (κi(y)
) 2m−j
2m−i = (s(y)2m−i ) 2
m−j
2m−i = s(y)2m−j = κj(y).
2 The initialization of the scheme is assumed to be the 0th “update event”.
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In other words, the user ﬁrst uses the current IKE KAS to compute the current key for the desired security label, and then
computes the key for the desired time interval.
Note that the node-based KAS that is used for the keys κ0(x), . . . ,κm(x) has the property deﬁned in (2). Hence, it is not
possible for a user to compute a future key from an existing one.
3.1.2. Hash-chain iterative MKAS
In this scheme, keys are chosen in such a way that κj(x) can be derived iteratively from κi(x). For each x ∈ L, the trusted
center chooses a key κm(x) ∈ {0, 1}l and deﬁnes κi−1(x) = h(κi(x)), where h : {0, 1}* → {0, 1}l is a hash function. We call
κm(x), κm−1(x) = h(κm(x)), . . . , κi(x) = hm−i(κm(x)), . . . , κ0(x) = hm(κm(x))
a hash chain for x. This type of approach has been used in one-time password schemes [11], and means that a user cannot
compute a future key from an existing one.
In order to recover κj(y), given κi(x), with y  x and j < i, the user ﬁrst computes κi(y) using the public information for
the ith IKE KAS, as before. The user then iteratively derives κj(y), by computing κi−1(y) = h(κi(y)), . . . ,κj(y) = h(κj+1(y)).
3.1.3. Example
Fig. 2 illustrates how an asynchronous scheme would evolve over time, using the poset depicted in Fig. 1a. Labels for
which new keys are generated are represented by unﬁlled nodes; existing keys are represented by ﬁlled nodes; edges that
need to be updated are represented by broken edges. At any moment in time, the public information is used to compute
current keys; previous keys are computed using an Akl–Taylor or hash chain.
Prior to any updates, a single key exists for each security label. A user with security label d is then removed from the
scheme,meaning that κ(d)has to be refreshed. Since d is theminimal element in the poset, no other keys need to be changed.
In the asynchronous schemewemust recompute the public information Eκ(b)(κ(d)) and Eκ(c)(κ(d)), the “edge encryptions”
for (d, b) and (d, c). This is depicted in Fig. 2b.
Then a user with security label b is removed from the scheme, meaning that κ(b) has to be refreshed. Since d < b, we
must also update κ(d). In addition, we must re-compute all edges from elements immediately greater than either b or d.
This is shown in Fig. 2c. Notice that if, instead of removing the user with security label b from the scheme, we changed her
security label to c, then the update set is {b} rather than {b, d} (since d < c); in this case, we would only update κ(b) and
re-compute Eκ(a)(κ(b)) and Eκ(b)(κ(d)).
3.1.4. MTMA MKAS
Finally, we introduce a bounded scheme based on the MTMA labeling. We note that we can regard the set of keys
{κi(l) : l ∈ L, 0 i  m} as being associated with the nodes in the poset L × T , where T is a chain of m elements. We write
(x, i) for the ith element in the chain for node x. It is obvious, therefore, that we can decompose L × T into |L| chains, each
containingm + 1 elements.
Hence, we can deﬁne anMKAS inwhich all keys are deﬁned using the Akl–Taylor schemewith theMTMA labeling, where
each node is associated with a different prime. More speciﬁcally, the trusted center ﬁrst obtains a large compound integer n
and chooses a prime α(x) for each x ∈ L. Then the trusted center
• selects a secret s ∈ Z*n;
• deﬁnes α(x, i) = α(x)m+1−i, 0 i  m;
• computes and publishes
ν(x, i) =
∏
y  x,
j>i
α(y, j);
• deﬁnes κi(x) = sν(x,i).
Fig. 2. Key updates in an asynchronous scheme.
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If a user u has κi(x), then she can directly compute
κj(y) = κi(x)
ν(y,j)
ν(x,i)
for any y  x and any j  i. In other words, this scheme has the advantage that key derivation is always performed in a single
step, at the expense of requiringO (m|L|) storage for public information. Moreover, u cannot compute κj(y) for any y  x or
any j > i since this scheme is just an instance of the Akl–Taylor scheme (using the MTMA labeling) for the poset L × T .
3.2. Unbounded synchronous MKASs
We now assume that the number of updates is not known in advance, and that all keys are updated at the same time.
Note that any unbounded synchronous MKAS can be used as a bounded synchronous MKAS.
A feature of the Akl–Taylor KAS is that it is possible to update all the keys simply by choosing a new system secret. No
public information needs to change, unlike any IKE KAS. Using this observation, we propose two synchronous MKAS. In the
ﬁrst scheme, user u is required to keep all earlier versions of κ(λ(u)). In the second scheme, u only requires a single key.
3.2.1. Node-based MKAS
Initially, the trusted center
• runs the RSA key generator to obtain n;
• chooses a system secret s0 ∈ Z*n at random;
• deﬁnes a mapping ν : L → N* such that ν(x) | ν(y) if and only if y  x;
• publishes {n} ∪ {ν(x) : x ∈ L};
• deﬁnes κ0(x) = sν(x)0 mod n.
Following the ith update event, the trusted center
• chooses a new system secret si ∈ Z*n, where (si, sj) = 1 for all j < i;
• deﬁnes κi(x) = sν(x)i mod n.
A user with security label x can derive κj(y), y  x, using κj(x) and the public information ν(x) and ν(y).
Two signiﬁcant advantages of this scheme are that the number of update events does not need to be deﬁned before the
scheme is instantiated, and the public information does not need to be updated. Of course, the user now accumulates keys
as the scheme develops, so private storage requirements increase and the user is required to manage a number of different
keys.
3.2.2. Node-based RSA MKAS
A reﬁnement of the schemedescribed above is to use a deterministicmethod for generating new system secrets. Of course,
wemust ensure that future keys cannot easily be computed from existing ones. The scheme is initialized in the same way as
in Section 3.2.1, except that the trusted center publishes e as well as n. Following the ith update event, the trusted center
• computes a new system secret si = sdi−1 mod n;
• deﬁnes κi(x) = sν(x)i mod n.
Note that
(
κi(y)
)e = (sν(y)
i
)e = (sei )ν(y) = ((sdi−1)e)ν(y) = (sdei−1)ν(y) = sν(y)i−1 = κi−1(y).
Hence the user now only needs to retain the most recent key: he can derive κj(y) from κi(x) (y  x, j  i) by ﬁrst computing
κi(y) from the public information, and then iteratively computing κj′(y), i > j
′  j. The advantages of this scheme are that
the user only requires a single key and the public information is ﬁxed. The disadvantage is that key derivation is iterative if
the key is for an earlier time interval.
Note that a user cannot feasibly compute a future key from an existing one, as this would require the ability to compute
d, which in turn requires the ability to factorize n. In other words, the security of future keys relies on the same assumptions
as the RSA cryptosystem.
3.3. Unbounded asynchronous MKASs
It would be convenient if we could adapt the schemes described in Section 3.2 to construct an unbounded asynchronous
MKAS. However, such an adaptation is not possible, in general, because keys are a function of public information and a secret
value.
Aswe have seen in Section 3.2, it is easy to change all keys in an Akl–Taylor scheme by changing the secret value. However,
changing the prime associated with one element of L may cause changes to a number of different keys. To see this, consider
the poset in Fig. 1 and the effect of changing the prime associated with b to 11. This has the effect of changing both κ(c) and
κ(d) because ν(c) and ν(d) are both deﬁned in terms of the prime associated with b.
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Fig. 3. Dynamic information ﬂow policies for an unbounded asynchronous MKAS.
3.3.1. Iterative RSA MKAS
Hence, we need to adopt an alternative approach to develop an unbounded asynchronous MKAS. Informally, we use a
method similar to that in Section 3.2 to create key chains for each x ∈ L, and link these chains using an IKE KAS.More formally,
the trusted center
• runs the RSA key generator to produce (n, e, d);
• for each label x ∈ L, chooses secret κ0(x) at random from Z*n;
• publishes {n, e};
• constructs an IKE KAS for L.
Following the ith key revocation for security label x, the trusted center
• computes, κi(x) = κdi−1 mod n;
• replaces κi−1(x) in the IKE KAS with κi(x);
• updates the public information for the IKE KAS.
Note that
(κi(y))
e = ((κi−1(y))d)e = κi−1(y). (3)
Suppose now that user uwith κi(x)wishes to derive κj(y), x  y, i > j. Then u can compute κi(y)using the public information
in the IKE KAS, and can now iteratively compute κj(y) using the computation deﬁned in (3).
3.3.2. Iterative MKAS
The second schemeemploys a single IKEKAS. Thedifference is that L nowevolves over time. Using the example depicted in
Fig. 2, each of the three Hasse diagramswould represent different posets, rather than the same poset with different numbers
of keys associatedwith each of the nodes. Following an update to κ(d), wewould construct an IKE KAS for the poset depicted
in Fig. 3a. Similarly, following an update to κ(b), we would construct an IKE KAS for the poset depicted in Fig. 3b.
More formally, for each node x in the update set, we need to:
• insert a new node x′;
• add a new edge (x, x′); and
• for each edge (x, y), we need to insert a new edge (x′, y) and delete (x, y).
A key for x′ needs to be selected and the public information for the new edges computed and published.
The advantage of this scheme is its simplicity. The disadvantage is that the number of nodes and edges, and hence the
amount of public information, grows over time.
3.4. Summary
We summarize the characteristics of our schemes in Fig. 4. The basic design features of each scheme are described in
Fig. 4a. Note, in particular, the MTMA scheme (Section 3.1.4), which uses a single method for both the policy and temporal
dimensions. We only indicate whether a scheme is unbounded or not and whether a scheme is asynchronous or not: any
unbounded scheme can be used as a bounded scheme, and any asynchronous scheme can be used as a synchronous scheme.
Fig. 4b summarizes a number of operational characteristics, including those identiﬁed by Crampton et al. [7] as being
of interest when assessing key assignment schemes. The derivation column includes the key derivation method within the
policy and temporal dimensions: we write “Dir” to denote direct key derivation and “Ind” to denote indirect key derivation.
Some schemes require public information to be updated following a change of keys; this is indicated in the column headed
“Public Update”. Storage requirements indicate the number of items of data that need to be stored in theworst case following
u updates; E denotes the edge set in the Hasse diagram of L. The storage required is proportional to the value given in the
table (the constant of proportionality being determined by the cryptographic primitives chosen to implement the scheme).
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Fig. 4. Characteristics of our schemes. (a) Design characteristics. (b) Operational characteristics.
3.5. Discussion
It is difﬁcult to make a deﬁnitive statement about which of these schemes is the best, because “best” may depend on the
context in which a scheme is to be deployed. In an ideal world, a scheme would: have direct key derivation and low storage
costs; be unbounded and asynchronous; not require updates to public information; and each user would have a single key.
Of course, none of these schemes have all these features.
It is not clearwhether asynchronous schemesoffer any signiﬁcant advantages: again, thiswill probablydependon context.
It should be noted that many updates for label l will require updates for all l′  l. In some scenarios, therefore, it may be
simpler to use a synchronous scheme. Nevertheless, if we can assume (or know) that most of the update activity will be
for relatively junior security labels, then there may well be a distinct advantage to using this incremental approach. This
may well be a reasonable assumption: there will probably be fewer users with relatively senior labels, and those users are
probably less likely to be re-assigned to new security labels or removed from the scheme.
Of the bounded schemes, the one based on theMTMA labeling has some appealing features, particularly compared to the
other two bounded schemes: key derivation is direct and no updates are required for public information. As we showed in
Section 2.2.3, there exist implementations of the Akl–Taylor schemewith theMTMA labeling that permit fast key derivation.
As we have noted, temporal access control policies do not require an asynchronous scheme and generally will not
require the scheme to be unbounded. Hence, suitable choices for enforcing such policies would be the schemes described in
Sections 3.1.4 and 3.2.2. The trade-off here is between partial iterative key derivation and amount of public data. Generally,
the storage required for public data will be an insigniﬁcant fraction of the storage available (see [16] for a discussion of such
considerations), so direct key derivation is likely to be preferred. In contrast, if we wish to support lazy re-encryption, then
we should choose an asynchronous scheme. We will also probably require an unbounded scheme, so a suitable choice in
these circumstances would be one of the schemes described in Section 3.3.
4. Conclusion
Updating keys is known to be an issue in cryptographic access control when the same encryption key is used to encrypt
many different data objects. This problem occurs in cryptographic storage ﬁle systems, where techniques such as key
regression have been used so that re-encryption of data objects is not necessarily performed when the encryption key
is refreshed. The problem is even more pressing in key assignment schemes for hierarchical access control, in which a
number of different keys may need to change at the same point in time, meaning that even higher volumes of data may
need to be re-encrypted at some point. We have introduced the idea of multi-key assignment schemes and shown that such
schemes are useful in supporting lazy re-encryption and temporal access control policies. These are the ﬁrst such schemes
in the literature, and represent a considerable advance on existing approaches to key updates in KASs.
Nevertheless, a number of opportunities for further work exist. One obvious shortcoming of our approach to enforcing
temporal access control policies is that a user with a key for x ∈ L can derive all previous keys for x. In some cases, it may
be that a user can only access material from the point at which she starts paying for content. In such cases, it must not be
possible for the user to derive keys for time points before she started paying. It is not clear whether a simple modiﬁcation to
our schemes is sufﬁcient to enforce such requirements. A priority, then, will be to investigate this question.
700 J. Crampton / Journal of Logic and Algebraic Programming 78 (2009) 690–700
We noted in Section 2.2.4 that formal security analyses of KASs are beginning to appear in the literature. An informal
analysis suggests that the schemes presented in this paper are secure against key recovery. However, none of the schemes
has the property of key indistinguishability. Existing work suggests that a relatively simple extension to our schemes will be
sufﬁcient to obtain the key indistinguishability property. An important part of our future work will be to undertake a formal
analysis of our schemes and to modify them, where necessary, using similar methods to those found in [2,3,10].
On amore practical note, it would be of considerable practical interest to adapt the architecture used in cryptographic ﬁle
systems and implement a key assignment scheme for a hierarchical ﬁle system. Similarly, it would interesting to use XML
encryption to implement hierarchical access control for XML data.
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